companies to sell or invest in Japan continue to be obstructed by a bewildering web of barriers. During the Spring of 1991, Tokyo continued to stall in negotiations over Japan's cartelized construction and semiconductor markets. Meanwhile, Japanese corporations enjoyed virtually unlimited access to American markets. By early 1991, Japan's automobile makers had captured 30 per cent of the American market, contributing to the $3.2 billion in losses for United States producers over the preceding year with no upturn in sight.
So, given all these grim realities, had the White House finally awakened to the reality of America's rapid decline and Japan's rise into a global hegemon? Would it now demand that Japan genuinely open its markets, eliminate the trade deficit, and accept responsibilities for helping manage the global political economy commeansurate with Japanese power? Not quite. At stake was not America's future, millions of jobs and hundreds of billion of dollars in wealth. At stake instead was the Hawksbill turtle which was threatened with extinction by Japanese manufacturers of eyeglass frames, combs and jewelry which use tortoise shell. The White House threatened to impose duties or outright ban imports of Japanese fish and other wildlife products, which in 1990 ammounted to $353.8 million, unless Tokyo agreed to phase out the tortoise shell industry.
Political Economic Battlegrounds
Predictably, Japanese shrilly denounced the threatened sanctions as one more example of "Japan bashing." In addition to pride, at stake for Japan was a $ 125 million industry employing 2000 in the Nagasaki region. Some angry Japanese declared that the United States was dropping "another atomic bomb on Nagasaki". In constrast, most Americans and naturelovers worldwide applauded the White House threat. The tortoise shell industry is grisly even by hunting standards. Turtles are roasted alive over an open fire until their shells are soft enough to be ripped off. The naked turde is then flung back into the sea where it will soon die. A few days before sanctions would have taken effect, after bitter grumbling, Tokyo finally promised to eliminate the industry, although it did not present any timetable. The White House, as usual, unquestioningly accepted Tokyo's promise and lifted the sanction threat.
Most people sympathize with the plight of the sea turties, porpoises, whales, elephants and other species which have been decimated, particularly due to Janpanese consumer demand, and are relieved when the United States and other concerned countries come to their rescue. But it is certainly symbolic of the disarray and misguided priorities of White House policymakers when saving sea turtles rather than eliminating the $41 billion deficit is the focus of American policy toward Japan.
The sea turtle "crisis" of May 1991 is no anomaly. American policy toward Japan has been inconsistent and contradictory from the relationship's beginning. Presidents continually tout the bilateral relationship as "the world's most important, bar none" while privately expressing concern about Japan's rise into a global economic superpower. Is Japan America's greatest ally or threat? Are its markets open or closed? Do or do not Japanese firms dump their products overseas to destroy American and other foreign rivals? Will the 21st century be America's or Japan's? And if Tokyo does systematically follow neomercantist policies designed to capture the throne of global hegemony from the United States, what should Washington do to counter this threat?
The inability of Washington to resolve these conflcting visions with a comprehensive, systematic policy that serves American interests is the source of most bilateral problems. The United States has continually put its geopolitical interests in maintaining an alliance with Japan ahead of its geoeconomic interests in asserting a level playing field. Perhaps the major reason for this lopsided policy has been the belief that the American way of politics and business is surpreme and all other nations will emulate the United States if given an opportunity. The neoclassical economists who determine American policy cannot conceive of any economic success without free markets and have refused to accept the possibility that Japan's neomercantilism even exists, let alone has succeeded in creating and distributing wealth much more rapidly than the United States. Yet,
